U.S. Action in Venezuela and the Limits of International Law

On January 3, 2026, the United States conducted a military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.[i] The United States characterized this operation as a domestic law-enforcement action, grounded in the indictment that U.S. courts have against Maduro.[ii] Although the operation occurred in another sovereign state, the United States did not address international law or the United Nations’ framework for military intervention.[iii] Regardless of characterization, this operation constituted a violation of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.[iv] More troubling, the United States completely bypassed international law, exposing a structural vulnerability and setting a dangerous precedent that powerful countries can ignore jus ad bellum constraints—the body of law governing when states may lawfully resort to force—and the framework of international law.

 The U.S. administration grounded the military operation in domestic authority rather than international legal justifications.[v] Maduro had been indicted in the United States and was considered a fugitive of the U.S. criminal justice system.[vi] This approach draws on a 1989 Office of Legal Counsel opinion, authored by then-Attorney General Bill Barr, which allows the United States to conduct international arrests with military support without regard to whether the conduct violates international law.[vii] However, this domestic policy stands in tension with the U.N. Charter[viii] and international law.

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states that countries shall refrain “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”[ix] Commentators have described the U.S. strikes as a use of force against Venezuela that violated Article 2(4).[x] Characteristics of the attack resemble a military operation rather than domestic law enforcement: more than 150 aircraft were launched from twenty locations, 15,000 U.S. troops were involved, over seventy fatalities occurred, it was ordered by the U.S. President (the highest form of authority), and was executed against a background of strained diplomatic relations.[xi]

Use of force against another state must either be supported by a resolution from the U.N. Security Council or fit one of the exceptions to Article 2(4)’s prohibition against the use of force: self-defense, invitation, humanitarian intervention or anticipatory self-defense in response to weapons of mass destruction.[xii] In the absence of a U.N. Security Council resolution, the United States has not made any plausible arguments under these exceptions that may have justified its actions, effectively dismissing the need for compliance with international law.[xiii]

The United States cannot claim self-defense to justify its attack on Venezuela, as Venezuela was not attacking the United States.[xiv] This exception requires an “armed attack” against the United States or an actual belief that use of force was imminent.[xv] The drug trafficking allegations, which form the foundation of Maduro’s indictment, do not rise to the level of an “armed attack” that can trigger self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.[xvi] Further, there are no allegations that Venezuela possesses weapons of mass destruction that would justify an anticipatory self-defense claim.[xvii]

The argument that Venezuela invited the United States’ use of force also fails. Although leaders of the opposition party expressed approval of the U.S. raid, approval must come from the country’s legitimate government.[xviii] The argument still fails despite the identity of Venezuela’s lawful government being contested internationally, and despite the United States refusal to recognize Maduro’s government as legitimate.[xix]

Notably, the United States did not invoke its strongest argument: humanitarian necessity.[xx] Although it remains deeply contested, humanitarian intervention is an emerging doctrine justifying unilateral use of force to prevent foreign governments from committing atrocities against their own populations, even without formal UN approval.[xxi] Claims about rescuing the Venezuelan population and preventing atrocities could have been powerful moral and political justifications, but the U.S. administration has not raised such claims.[xxii]

The United States’ bypass of international law raises the question of whether international law has the strength to hold powerful governments accountable. One potential avenue of accountability would be an indictment of U.S. President Donald Trump (or other individuals who orchestrated this attack) by the International Criminal Court (ICC).[xxiii] Venezuela is party to the Rome Statute, an instrument of international law that grants the ICC jurisdiction over acts of aggression carried out on member states’ territory, and the power to bring charges against individual actors, but not states, that violate the statute.[xxiv] However, political pressures make ICC action unlikely.[xxv] The ICC would be extremely cautious about proceeding against President Trump, as doing so could worsen already fragile relations between the ICC and the United States.[xxvi]

The final mode of accountability is horizontal enforcement – such as sanctions, asset freezes, or diplomatic isolation – however, a powerful country like the United States can withstand those pressures.[xxvii] The United States’ actions in Venezuela illustrate a structural vulnerability of the current international law framework: compliance with jus ad bellum constraints is optional for powerful states, and violations of such norms will be met with little to no consequences.

Victoria Pedreiro is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.

[i] See USA: Act of Aggression Against Venezuela Further Weakens Rules-Based International Order and Leaves Venezuelans Still Waiting for Justice, Amnesty International (Feb. 3, 2026), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/02/usa-aggression-against-venezuela-further-weakens-rules-based-order/.

[ii] See Stanford Legal Podcast – Q&A With Allen Weiner, Flexing United States Power in Venezuela, Stanford Law School (Jan. 10, 2026).

[iii] See Thomas Lee, Trump OLC’s Punt on the Global Legal Case for Venezuela Matters, Bloomberg L. (Jan. 15, 2026), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-olcs-punt-on-the-global-legal-case-for-venezuela-matters.

[iv] U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting use of force).

[v] See Stanford Legal Podcast, supra note 2.

[vi] See Sarah Heathcote, Were the US Actions in Venezuela Legal Under International Law? An Expert Explains, The Conversation (Jan. 3, 2026), https://theconversation.com/were-the-us-actions-in-venezuela-legal-under-international-law-an-expert-explains-272684.

[vii] See Stanford Legal Podcast, supra note 2.

[viii] U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting use of force).

[ix] Id.

[x] See Heathcote, supra note 6.

[xi] See Dan Lamothe, John Hudson & Hannah Natanson, Maduro Raid Killed About 75 in Venezuela, U.S. Officials Assess, Wash. Post (Jan. 6, 2026), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/01/06/maduro-raid-death-toll/; See also Heathcote, supra note 6.

[xii] See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 39–43 (authorizing Security Council enforcement action), 51 (recognizing the inherent right to self-defense); See also Lee, supra note 3.

[xiii] See Stanford Legal Podcast, supra note 2.

[xiv] See Amnesty International, supra note 1.

[xv] See Heathcote, supra note 6; See also Amnesty International, supra note 1.

[xvi] See Amnesty International, supra note 1.

[xvii] See Lee, supra note 3.

[xviii] See id.

[xix] See Heathcote, supra note 6.

[xx] See Stanford Legal Podcast, supra note 2.

[xxi] See id.

[xxii] See id.

[xxiii] See id.

[xxiv] See id.

[xxv] See id.

[xxvi] See id.

[xxvii] See id.

This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.