Capturing Heads-of-State: The Noriega Precedent
In the early hours of January 3, 2026, reports started circulating across Venezuela of helicopters and explosions in various places across the country. In the early minutes of the attack, Donald Trump's threats seemed to materialize as the United States launched its initial strikes against key military targets of the Bolivarian Republic[i]. A tweet from the White House confirmed that the United States military had captured Nicolás Maduro Moros, and a picture quickly began circulating of the Venezuelan President blindfolded, on board the U.S.S. Iwo Jima.[ii] As more reports emerged, details of the operation came to light. It had been conducted by the controversial and clandestine 'Delta Force.'[iii]
During the Maduro years (2013-26), Venezuela saw the worst economic and humanitarian crisis in its history.[iv] A collapse in oil prices plunged the largely oil-dependent country, with the world's largest proven reserves, into a catastrophic recession.[v] Millions of Venezuelans had no other choice but to flee the country.[vi] This period also saw a tightening of political control, reflected in the increase in political prisoners and underscored by the reported atrocities at the highly controversial Helicoide prison.[vii]
The military strike and subsequent capture of Nicolas Maduro struck a familiar chord to Operation 'Just Cause' in 1989 against the Panamanian leader, Manuel Noriega.[viii] In Operation 'Just Cause', President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to invade Panama and capture its military dictator, Manuel Noriega.[ix] Even though Noriega did not hold an official role as head of state of Panama at the time, he was the de facto leader.[x] In many ways, this operation saw the emergence of the legal blueprint that the Trump administration has followed in Maduro's capture and the broader military campaign against Venezuela. In both instances, the Bush and Trump administrations invoked the language of self-defense to justify their respective operations.[xi] The Trump administration reasoned that Maduro's funding and collusion with "narco-terrorist" groups like the infamous "Tren de Aragua" constituted an armed attack against the United States and thus merited military action to put an end to the alleged attack.[xii]
Beyond questions concerning the legality of the attack itself, any enforcement or formal proceeding against the U.S. is unlikely.[xiii] One question that does seem especially pertinent is whether Maduro could invoke sovereign immunity in U.S. proceedings against him.[xiv] In Manuel Noriega's case, he was not recognized as the de jure head of state, and the Panamanian government did not request immunity, so the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his claim of sovereign immunity.[xv] The court applied the test found in In re Doe.[xvi] In Doe, the second circuit held that, absent a formal suggestion of immunity from the Executive Branch, a putative head of state should receive no immunity.[xvii] Applying this standard, the court found that not only was there no formal suggestion of immunity, but that the Executive Branch, by pursuing Noriega and prosecuting him, had clearly manifested that no such immunity applied.[xviii]
In the case of Venezuela, a court would likely interpret the military operation, capture, and subsequent prosecution of Maduro as a clear message from the Executive Branch that immunity is inapplicable. The court in Noriega also relied on the fact that Noriega had never been the constitutional head of state in Panama, and that the charged acts relate to Noriega's private pursuit of personal enrichment.[xix] In our current case, Maduro was the de facto and, arguably, de jure President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The legitimacy of Maduro's status as head of state was, however, widely contested due to allegations of electoral fraud and interference, ultimately leading the United States to cease recognizing him as Venezuela's legitimate President in January 2019.[xx] Even if a court were to recognize the legitimacy of Maduro's presidency, it would likely defer to direction from the Executive Branch.[xxi]
Paul Montgomery is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[i] See Regina Garcia Cano, Maduro says Venezuela is open to U.S. talks on drug trafficking, but keeps mum on CIA strike, PBS News (Jan. 2, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/maduro-says-venezuela-is-open-to-u-s-talks-on-drug-trafficking-but-keeps-mum-on-cia-strike.
[ii] Josephine Walker & Lauren Floyd, Trump shares photo of Maduro after capture, Axios (Jan. 3, 2026), https://www.axios.com/2026/01/03/maduro-photo-trump-capture.
[iii] See Julian E. Barnes, Tyler Pager & Eric Schmitt, Inside 'Operation Absolute Resolve,' the U.S. Effort to Capture Maduro, The New York Times (Jan. 3, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/us/politics/trump-capture-maduro-venezuela.html; See also Seth Harp, Mission Impossible: The sad state of the American armed forces, Harper's Magazine (Oct. 2025), https://harpers.org/archive/2025/10/mission-impossible-seth-harp-trump-military-parade/.
[iv] See Diana Roy & Amelia Cheatham, Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate, Council on Foreign Relations (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/venezuela-crisis.
[v] See id.
[vi] See United Nations News, Four million have now fled Venezuela, UN ramps up aid to children who remain, (June 7, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040001.
[vii] See Karenina Velandia & Charlie Newland, El Helicoide: From an icon to an infamous Venezuelan jail, BBC (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46864864.
[viii] See David J. Scheffer, Maduro's Capture and International Law: The Noriega Precedent, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan 6, 2026), https://www.cfr.org/articles/maduros-capture-and-international-law-noriega-precedent.
[ix] See id.
[x] See id.
[xi] See id.
[xii] See Matthew Olay, Trump Announces U.S. Military's Capture of Maduro, Pentagon News (Jan. 3, 2026), https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4370431/trump-announces-us-militarys-capture-of-maduro/.
[xiii] See Security Council Report, In Hindsight: The Security Council's Muted Response to the Venezuela Crisis, (Feb. 1, 2026), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-02/in-hindsight-the-security-councils-muted-response-to-the-venezuela-crisis.php.
[xiv] See Chimene Keitner, Head of State Immunity and Maduro on Trial, Just Security (Jan. 6, 2026), https://www.justsecurity.org/128073/head-of-state-immunity-maduro-trial/.
[xv] See Id.
[xvi] In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
[xvii] Id.
[xviii] United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
[xix] Id.
[xx] Press Release, White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump Recognizing Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela, (Jan. 23, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-recognizing-venezuelan-national-assembly-president-juan-guaido-interim-president-venezuela/.
[xxi] See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995).
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.