What U.S. Withdrawal from the UNFCCC and the Green Climate Fund Reveals About the Limits of International Climate Law
On January 7, 2026, a United States Presidential Memorandum directed U.S. executive departments and agencies “to effect withdrawal from various international organizations, conventions and treaties, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)[i].”As a response, on January 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury posted a press release announcing that they notified the Green Climate Fund (GCF) that “the United States is withdrawing from the Fund and stepping down from its seat on the GCF Board, effective immediately.[ii]”
The UNFCCC provides the central legal and institutional framework for international coordination on climate change with over 190 parties, making it one of the most widely ratified treaties worldwide.[iii] The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”[iv]
The GCF functions as an operating entity of the Convention’s financial mechanism, with the objective of supporting climate action.[v] Its resources are allocated to support low-emission and climate-resilient projects and programs in developing countries.[vi]
International climate law is built primarily on voluntary state action rather than enforceable legal obligations.[vii] The UNFCCC establishes a framework for a general commitment, but it does not impose specific emission limits or sanctions for noncompliance.[viii] Instead it relies on good-faith participations by the state, and while that makes it appealing and encourages participation, it also limits its ability to ensure consistent compliance.[ix]
The United States’ withdrawal therefore illustrates the limited legal consequences associated with exit from international climate agreements. The UNFCCC establishes a withdrawal mechanism that requires notice but do not attach any penalties or consequences.[x] Therefore, the consequences are reputational and diplomatic rather than legal, making participation depend on political will, not enforceable legal constraint.
United States’ withdrawal from GCF was immediate, considering being a party to the UNFCCC is a “pre-requisite for representation in the GCF Board.”[xi] The statement released by GCF after United States’ withdrawal made sure to reaffirm “its commitment to fight climate change, which remains a fundamental threat to international development, security and long-term prosperity.”[xii] Its fund remains relies on voluntary pledges rather than any financial obligations, and there is no mechanism to impose continued support. As a result, the withdrawal of any major contributor does not violate a legal duty, even though it might disrupt its climate objectives.
The United States’ withdrawal from the UNFCCC and GCF reveals fundamental constraints within international climate law. While it successfully helps when it comes to broad participations from the states, it remains heavily dependent on political commitment rather than enforceable legal obligation. This structural reliance on voluntarism continues to shape both the strengths and the vulnerabilities of international efforts to address climate change.
Scholars have emphasized that international climate law relies less on coercive enforcement than on institutional credibility, predictability, and sustained participation by major emitters to function effectively.[xiii] When an important actor disengages with minimal legal consequence, it may weaken confidence in multilateral climate institutions and signal instability to other states and non-state actors that depend on consistent international commitments for long-term planning.[xiv] At the same time, experts have noted that the flexibility embedded in climate agreements, while instrumental in achieving broad participation, also leaves the regime vulnerable to shifts in domestic political priorities.[xv] In this respect, the U.S. withdrawal reinforces longstanding scholarly concerns that the climate regime’s deliberate reliance on voluntary compliance may undermine its capacity to produce durable collective action in response to global environmental challenges.
Bianca Luminita Dascal is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[i] Green Climate Fund statement on the United States’ withdrawal from GCF, Green Climate Fund (Jan. 9, 2026), https://www.greenclimate.fund/statement/green-climate-fund-statement-united-states-withdrawal-gcf
[ii] Press Release, Treasury Announces the United States’ Immediate Withdrawal from the Green Climate Fund (Jan.8, 2026), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0352
[iii] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Climate, Peace and Security, United Nations, https://www.un.org/climatesecuritymechanism/en/united-nations-framework-convention-climate-change-unfccc-and-climate-peace-and-security (last visited Jan.16, 2026)
[iv]Avoiding “dangerous” interference in the climate system: The roles of values, science and policy, Richard H. Moss, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/095937809500022G (last visited Feb 1, 2026)
[v] Green Climate Fund, United Nations Environment Programme, https://www.unep.org/about-un-environment/funding-and-partnerships/green-climate-fund (last updated May 13, 2025)
[vi] See id
[vii] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[viii] See id. art. 3
[ix] See id
[x] See id., art. 25
[xi] See Green Climate Fund, supra note 1
[xii] See id
[xiii] Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Climate Change Governance, 5 Climate L. 1, 6–9 (2015)
[xiv] World Resources Institute, Designing the Paris Rulebook: Compliance, Transparency, and Trust (2017)
[xv] Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Agreement: Durability and Flexibility, 28 Rev. Eur. Comp. & Int’l Envtl. L. 3, 5-10 (2019).
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.