Deals Under Pressure: Legal Implications of Bilateral Deep Sea Mining Agreements With the United States
The Trump administration, via a White House statement on October 20th, 2025, announced the bilateral “common policy framework” for the United States-Australia mining deal. [1] This “mutual support” agreement seeks to develop strategic resource supply security of “critical minerals and rare earths” necessary for commercial and defense technologies. [2] The administration committed to invigorating the sector with $8.5 billion in loans, guarantees, and investment support alongside facility construction and armament deals. [3] Notably, the agreement includes a provision stating that post-project analysis and implementation will be later developed pursuant to each nation’s domestic laws. [4] Seven days later, the White House announced another mineral framework agreement with Japan, adding it to a coterie of other Pacific and Central Asian state commitments. [5] However, this slew of bilateral agreements is solidifying in the wake of a pattern of questionable commitments from the Trump Administration to international deep-sea mining law. [6]
In April 2025, the White House released Executive Order 14285, titled, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources,” declaring a US strategy to “counter China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources” and to helm as the global leader in securing mineral markets by issuing international mining permits pursuant to domestic law. [7] The consensus on Executive Order 14285’s consistency with international law, however, remains split between legal commentators. [8] The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), of which the US is not a party, declared international water seabeds “common heritage of mankind” and established the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate their exploitation in Part XI of the agreement. [9] Executive Order 14285 was criticized by China, a leading UNCLOS member, arguing that Part XI reflects international customary law and is thus binding on all states. [10] Denouncers, citing U.S. v. Alaska, further argue that the United States government and courts have previously acted in acknowledgement that UNCLOS’s principles exist as established customary international law; such usurpation of ISA’s licensing authority, they declare, is therefore illegal. [11] Supporters of Executive Order 14285’s legality argue that “[s]tate practice and opinio juris are ambiguous on a prohibition of unilateral mining outside the Convention” and that “agreement is not tantamount to accepting the validity of the entire body of rules” of Part XI. [12]
An emerging consideration, however, remains that many nations with whom the United States has signed bilateral common policy frameworks, such as Australia and Japan, are parties to UNCLOS and are legally bound to the regulatory authority imposed by ISA. [13] Compounding this issue, the United States’ frameworks for bilateral agreements with both Japan and Australia leave the specifics of the cooperation to be determined on future dates and are, again, governed by the domestic laws of each state. [14] Should the United States later cooperate with Australia, for example, to engage in deep sea mining outside of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) pursuant to their bilateral common policy framework, the United States’ disregard for ISA may encourage or coerce other states to follow, further stripping of the multilateral agreement’s authority over member states. [15] Currently, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in the wake of Executive Order 14285, is permitted to issue surveying and mining licenses beyond United States EEZ, but only to citizens, companies, and domestic subsidiaries of international companies. [16] But should the Trump administration push hard enough, NOAA potentially certifying international firms in mutual support agreements may serve to further challenge ISA’s current dominance. In the Trump administration’s fight to contest China’s manipulative dominance of the international mineral markets [17], ISA’s historic authority may become a casualty.
Matthew L. Giannotti is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[1] See United States–Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths, The White House (Oct. 20, 2025) [hereinafter United States–Australia Framework], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/united-states-australia-framework-for-securing-of-supply-in-the-mining-and-processing-of-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths/.
[2] See Bruno Arpi & Donald R. Rothwell, Critical Minerals: The U.S. Bid to Bypass International Rules on Deep Sea Mining, The Interpreter (Lowy Inst.), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/critical-minerals-us-bid-bypass-international-rules-deep-sea-mining; id.
[3] See Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Closes Billion-Dollar Deals with Australia, The White House (Oct. 20, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/10/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-closes-billion-dollar-deals-with-australia/.
[4] See United States–Australia Framework, supra note 1.
[5] See United States–Japan Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths Through Mining and Processing, The White House (Oct. 27, 2025) [hereinafter United States–Japan Framework], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/united-states-japan-framework-for-securing-the-supply-of-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths-through-mining-and-processing/.
[6] See Arpi & Rothwell, supra note 2.
[7] See Exec. Order No. 14,285, 90 Fed. Reg 17735 (Apr. 29, 2025).
[8] See generally James Kraska, The U.S. Executive Order on Seabed Mining Is Consistent with International Law, 106 Int’l L. Stud. 499 (U.S. Naval War Coll. 2025), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol106/iss1/15/ (arguing legal defensibility of position under international law, as United States is not legally bound by UNCLOS and previously objected to its applicability). But see, Arpi & Rothwell, supra note 6; Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47324, Seabed Mining in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Issues for Congress (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47324 (outlining policy context and legal challenges for Congress as U.S. engages with emerging field of seabed mining).
[9] Part XI created a global governance regime for deep seabed resources, placing them under international management through the International Seabed Authority to further goals of orderly development of mineral activities beyond national jurisdiction. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. XI, annex, § 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 387, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/agreement_part_xi/agreement_part_xi.htm#section2.
[10] See Gracelin Baskaran & Meredith Schwartz, Trump’s Deep-Sea Mining Executive Order: The Race for Critical Minerals Enters Uncharted Waters, Ctr. For Strategic & Int’l Stud. (CSIS), https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-deep-sea-mining-executive-order-race-critical-minerals-enters-uncharted-waters (last visited Nov. 10, 2025).
[11] See Regulatory Roundup: Navigating a New Era—The Latest in the Race for Deep-Sea Minerals, Perkins Coie (Nov. 4, 2025), https://perkinscoie.com/insights/blog/latest-race-deep-sea-minerals; Angelle C. Smith, Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 651, 653 (2011); see also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997) (holding that federal government prevails in disputes involving offshore resource management and ownership).
[12] James Kraska, The U.S. Executive Order on Seabed Mining Is Consistent with International Law, 106 Int’l L. Stud. 499, 508 (2025), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol106/iss1/15/.
[13] See International Seabed Authority Member States, Int’l Seabed Auth., https://isa.org.jm/member-states/; see United States–Australia Framework, supra note 1; see United States–Japan Framework, supra note 5.
[14] See United States–Japan Framework, supra note 5; see also See United States–Australia Framework, supra note 1.
[15] See generally Harrison Prétat & Monica Sato, The Risks of U.S. Deep-Sea Mining, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Aug. 26, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/risks-us-deep-sea-mining (warning that such bypasses of international law encourage similar actions by other states in international mining).
[16] See Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, supra note 8, summary.
[17] See generally Gracelin Baskaran, The Consequences of China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions (providing evidence China uses export controls and licensing requirements as leverage over critical mineral markets as economic statecraft).
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.