Preventing “Judgment Laundering” in Transnational Litigation: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations
Through a comparative analysis of the EU, US, and UK systems, this Note shows that while each jurisdiction includes safeguards intended to preserve judicial legitimacy—such as public policy exceptions, due process protections, and jurisdictional requirements—structural gaps and inconsistencies remain exploitable. The Recast Brussels Regulation, particularly following the CJEU’s decision in J v. H Limited, introduces new vulnerabilities by expanding the definition of “judgment.” In the United States, the state-level adoption of the UFCMJRA promotes uniformity, but divergent laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause allow for procedural arbitrage. The United Kingdom, though recently reinforced by Strategic Technologies v. Procurement Bureau, still leaves open questions under its common law.
The Hague Judgments Convention offers a promising step forward by clearly excluding “judgment on a judgment” from its scope, but its effectiveness will depend on broader international adoption and consistent implementation. Ultimately, preventing judgment laundering will require stronger procedural safeguards, clearer limitations on indirect recognition, and greater international coordination to ensure that recognition frameworks cannot be manipulated to circumvent substantive legal review.
Recommended Citation: Hsin-Hui Hsu, Preventing “Judgment Laundering” in Transnational Litigation: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations, 49 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1345 (2026).