Overcoming Embeddedness: How China’s Judicial Accountability Reforms Make Its Judges More Autonomous
Studies frequently report significant divergence between institutional arrangements promoting judicial independence and judges’ actual independent behavior, particularly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries. Many believe that such divergence is especially likely in China, where the problem of judicial dependence is deeply embedded in local contexts and historical practices. Drawing on in-depth interviews with judges and lawyers from three provinces with diverse socioeconomic demographics, this Article assesses the judicial accountability reforms launched by the current Xi Jinping administration, which promise to empower individual judges to decide cases with minimal interference from superiors. Defying expectations, this Article finds that the reforms have enabled frontline judges to decide most cases without obtaining approval from court leaders and have limited the use of the powerful adjudication committees, making individual judges considerably more autonomous. It argues that what enabled this unexpected development is the regime’s recent power consolidation, which has put an end to China’s decades-old policy fragmentation and forces local agents to more faithfully implement the centrally mandated reform plans. The findings shed light on the relationship between the judges’ local embeddedness and the macrostructural dynamics, and compel researchers to reevaluate the diverse roles contemporary authoritarian regimes play in shaping judicial behaviors.
Recommended Citation: Yueduan Wang, Overcoming Embeddedness: How China’s Judicial Accountability Reforms Make Its Judges More Autonomous, 43 Fordham Int'l L.J. 737 (2020).