State Vulnerabilities as Guideposts for International Anti-Trafficking Legislation
The umbrella terms “trafficking in persons,” “human trafficking,” and “modern slavery” refer to the crime of exploitation and profit committed at the expense of adults or children by traffickers who compel them to perform labor or engage in commercial sex.[1] This illicit enterprise is one of the most profitable in the world, earning traffickers at least $150 billion annually,[2] and affecting an estimated 40.3 million people internationally.[3] Human trafficking bankrolls criminal organizations and terrorist groups, threatening global peace, security, and human rights.[4] Across countries and industries, traffickers consistently prey upon the most vulnerable groups.[5] For example, discriminatory labor laws which limit professional options for many women and girls increase their susceptibility to traffickers who promise them better opportunities.[6] Women and girls are three times more likely to suffer explicit or extreme violence during trafficking compared to men and boys.[7] Similarly, children are two times more likely to be subjected to violence than adults while being trafficked.[8]
Although there is no universal instrument that addresses all aspects of trafficking in persons,[9] more than 175 nations have ratified or acceded to the United Nations Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Protocol adopted in 2000, which contains legal obligations to prevent and combat the crime.[10] The protocol requires criminalization of traffickers and their accomplices, as well as the provision of resources for victims.[11] Efforts to comply with the TIP Protocol have varied in format and success across countries.[12] In order to effectively combat human trafficking, anti-trafficking legislation must be tailored to the unique vulnerabilities of the country in which it is enacted, whether those vulnerabilities are influenced by region, local economics, or any number of other factors and trends.
The vulnerability of certain groups to exploitation and the factors that influence these vulnerabilities are inconsistent across nations. Conflicts, for example, increase vulnerability to trafficking.[13] The Taliban takeover on August 15th, 2021 severely hindered Afghanistan’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts and reports, likely exacerbating a pre-existing pattern of government recruitment and employment of child soldiers.[14] After August 15, the Taliban did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers, nor did it identify or protect any trafficking victims or make any efforts to prevent trafficking.[15]
Perhaps less predictably, human trafficking is also a tragic cost of China’s Belt Road initiative, not only for China itself, but for countries employing their own citizens in related construction projects, mining operations, and factories.[16] Workers in African, European, Middle Eastern, and other countries, have experienced debt bondage, arbitrary wage garnishment, and confiscation of identification and travel documents, as well as intimidation, physical violence, and denied access to urgent medical care.[17]
Climate change is also increasing the vulnerability of some people to trafficking.[18] Reporting demonstrates a direct correlation between the consequences of natural disasters and an increased risk of human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.[19] Wildfires, flooding, and extreme weather conditions linked to climate change often result in displacement that migrants, indigenous communities, women and children, and minority populations are more likely to experience, resulting in higher vulnerability of these groups to exploitation.[20] Countries with low climate readiness and high fragility such as Syria, South Sudan, and the Republic of Congo, have the highest risk of climate disaster.[21] Considering that the catastrophic consequences of climate change are already occurring,[22] the phenomenon has likely contributed to the designation of these countries as “Tier 3” in the United States’ July 2022 Trafficking in Persons report.[23]
In 2020, a drastic drop in the detection of trafficking for sexual exploitation was recorded in most of the world.[24] One explanation is that lockdown measures due to the COVID-19 pandemic pushed exploitation into less visible locations.[25] A 2021 annual report published by the German Federal Police supports this theory, indicating that sexual exploitation is moving from streets and brothels to private apartments.[26] Subsequent anti-trafficking legislation in Germany should respond to this shift, whereas countries who did not impose lockdown measures can disregard it.
Recent anti-trafficking legislation around the world has demonstrated a positive shift toward the inclusion of survivors in policymaking and advising at the national level.[27] In the United States, survivor-leaders have created landmark legislation in support of anti-trafficking efforts, developing trafficking training requirements for health care and social service providers, and improving detection of human trafficking-related financial transactions when surveilling money laundering and counter-terrorist financing activities.[28] The Canadian Government has committed to establishing a Survivor Advisory Committee, through which survivors may provide recommendations regarding the country’s anti-trafficking policies and initiatives.[29] The Governments of the Philippines and the United Kingdom sought survivor input to inform the provision of protection services.[30] The Governments of Guyana, Rwanda, and the Netherlands have also consulted survivors on updates to their respective national action plans.[31] Engaging survivors as partners is critical to establishing legislation that addresses the prevention, protection, and prosecution requirements of each country as determined by the unique vulnerabilities of their populations to exploitation.[32]
Lola Todman is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVII.
1. See Dep’t. of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 31 (2022).
2. See Int’l. Lab. Org., Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour 13 (2014).
3. Council on Foreign Relations, Human Trafficking in the Global Era, Wᴏʀʟᴅ 101 (Dec. 21, 2020), https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/globalization/human-trafficking-global-era.
4. Id.
5. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 7 (2022).
6. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 3.
7. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. See U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
10. See Dep’t. of State, supra note 1, at 31.
11. Supra note 9, at 41-42.
12. See generally U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 5; see also Dep’t. of State, supra note 1.
13. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 5, at 18.
14. See Dep’t. of State, supra note 1, at 78.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id.
18. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 5, at 18.
19. See Admin. for Child. and Families, Preventing and Addressing Human Trafficking in the Wake of Disasters, (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2022/09/preventing-and-addressing-human-trafficking-wake-disasters.
20. See Dep’t. of State, supra note 1, at 41.
21. See Int’l Rescue Committee, 10 Countries at Risk of Climate Disaster, (Jun. 12, 2023), https://www.rescue.org/article/10-countries-risk-climate-disaster.
22. Id.
23. See Dep’t. of State, supra note 1, at 55 (Recognizing Tier 3 governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so).
24. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 5, at 21.
25. Id. at 22.
26. Id. at 22.
27. See generally Dep’t. of State, supra note 1.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 2.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.