Private Power, Public Money: The Future of Sovereignty in a Digital Economy

Monetary competition within the United States has historically shifted between favoring private and public forms of money, at least partially in response to the relative power of public and private parties.[i] Cryptocurrencies, such as stablecoins, are a form of private money, whereas cash and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are public.[ii] A sovereign state’s[iii] ability to issue public money depends on its credibility when controlling involved private actors and while operating internationally.[iv] The state has exclusive authority to issue public money and grant it legal tender status.[v] Private entities, such as commercial banks and cryptocurrency platforms, can produce[vi] forms of money but are subject to the state’s legal and fiscal oversight.[vii] However, for the first time in modern history, a form of private money – stablecoins – appears capable of competing directly with circulating public money.[viii] This may threaten the state’s monetary sovereignty which is a cornerstone of a state’s authority in the modern era.[ix] This article discusses how the United States has turned to stablecoins and private parties as drivers of digital money innovation, while the European Union has chosen to prioritize consumer trust and the development of a form of public money intended to preserve state control - revealing two distinct responses to the same challenge of maintaining sovereignty in an increasingly digital economy.

Monetary sovereignty refers to a sovereign state’s ability, through means such as its central bank, to ensure the use of its currency and monetary policies (such as setting interest rates or tactics to manage capital flows).[x] A state loses this power and, therefore, its ability to safeguard its economic stability[xi] when its citizens begin using any money other than the currency it issues – regardless of whether they adopt a foreign or private form in its place.[xii] As citizens use forms of money that they view as reliable and stable, monetary sovereignty is dependent on public trust.[xiii] In this way, sovereignty risks arise both internally, from the adoption of private monies, and externally, from the adoption of foreign currencies – increasing in risk where competing currencies are viewed as more transparent or reliable.

Cash use has declined as preference shifts to digital transactions, backed and provided by private companies.[xiv] In response, states are considering CBDCs as a modern mechanism to prevent the displacement of public money and fulfill policy and economic goals.[xv] CBDCs, like the U.S. Dollar, are a form of fiat money – publicly issued currency without intrinsic value, instead legitimized by the liability (and, therefore, trust and stability) of its issuing government and central bank.[xvi] CBDCs may be structured for transactions between financial institutions (wholesale) or for general public use (retail).[xvii] As of July 2025, 137 countries and currency unions, accounting for 98% of global GDP, are exploring CBDCs.[xviii] Three countries – The Bahamas (‘Sand Dollar’), Jamaica (‘JAM-DEX’), and Nigeria (‘e-Nira’) – have launched retail CBDCs and 49 other central banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB) and the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), are in pilot phases.[xix]

A primary driver for CBDC development has been the significant consumer adoption and value gain seen by forms of private money, particularly stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies.[xx] Cryptocurrencies differ fundamentally from CBDCs because they are not backed by a central authority and, therefore, lack the institutional guarantees that protect users of public money.[xxi] Stablecoins attempt to mitigate consequential risk by stabilizing their worth through tying, or ‘pegging,’ their value to a more traditional asset, such as the U.S. Dollar.[xxii] However, this pegging mechanism is recognized as being inherently fragile, as seen in 2022 with the collapse of “TerraUSD”, a U.S. dollar-backed stablecoin, that caused USD 60 billion in losses.[xxiii] Further, last month the sixth-largest stablecoin in the world, PayPal’s dollar-backed stablecoin (PYUSD), experienced ‘an internal technical error’ which resulted in USD 300 trillion of tokens being mistakenly minted—illustrating that even when value is nominally guaranteed by private issuers, the peg is not intrinsically tied to actual reserves. [xxiv] Such incidents underscore the fallibility of private issuers and limitations of their operating frameworks.

Moreover, given that it is a form of private money, even the widespread adoption of a hypothetically infallible stablecoin would present risks to the State’s financial stability – risks that intensify as such private currencies become further integrated with the traditional financial system.[xxv] This should raise concern as the United States currently dominates the global stablecoin market,[xxvi] and its supply has been projected to grow from USD 230 billion in 2025 to USD 2 trillion by the end of 2028.[xxvii]

Although the U.S. dollar maintains global dominance today, the nation risks ceding monetary control – and, by extension, geopolitical influence – to both private actors and foreign states, thereby forfeiting the advantages arising out of monetary leadership while exposing itself to new vulnerabilities.[xxviii] Again, in both cases, sovereignty hinges on trust; and if others offer a more credible framework, the U.S. risks ceding ground both at home and abroad. Therefore, it is important to remember that CBDCs are public instruments, designed to safeguard citizens within the framework of the rule of law, whereas stablecoins, even when pegged to the U.S. dollar, are ultimately private instruments, designed to maximize shareholder returns.[xxix]

Currently, Europe seeks to entrench trust in public authority through its digital euro while U.S. policy relies on the credibility of private actors. Between January and July 2025, the Trump Administration introduced legislative measures, including the GENIUS Act,[xxx] to encourage the growth of private dollar-backed stablecoins while banning the development and issuance of a retail CBDC,[xxxi] citing privacy concerns and a desire to “promot[e] and protect[ ] the sovereignty of the [U.S.] dollar.”[xxxii] Whether this strategy is the best way to safeguard the country’s monetary sovereignty remains unclear. However, given that the ECB is taking diverging actions to meet the same goal, it is not the only way to try to do so.

Stablecoins can offer the appearance of state backing, especially when supported by high-profile figures or corporations, but they are not public money. Consider President Trump’s World Liberty Financials USD1, which has already grown into the world’s fifth-largest stablecoin with a market capitalization of USD 2.7 billion.[xxxiii] The issuance of digital money in private hands, and the concentrating of power outside the reach of public accountability, could lead to financial instability and affect monetary sovereignty.[xxxiv] Private projects attempting to leverage reputation and technology to issue forms of money have been shut down for these reasons in the past.[xxxv]  For example, Facebook’s 2019 proposal to launch Libra, a global U.S. dollar-backed stablecoin, was quickly abandoned after several state’s governments and regulators intervened, fearing that for these reasons, its potential power could shift control away from the State. [xxxvi]

Trust has become central to power in monetary competition, and Europe has a structural advantage: its comparatively “stable institutional framework and rules-based approach which provide a solid foundation for trust.” [xxxvii] Given the underlying volatility of the United States’ political and regulatory environment, the euro, therefore, has an opportunity to become the global bedrock currency – particularly if the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to advance a credible public alternative to cash, in the form of a CDBC, the digital euro.[xxxviii] The ECB sees the digital euro not only as a means of ensuring the continuing availability of a reliable currency for its citizens,[xxxix] but also as a political instrument to ensure Europe’s financial stability and autonomy.[xl]  Accordingly, the Eurosystem has focused its legislation on designing the digital euro to mitigate its potential risks and ensure public trust – primarily through developing robust regulation focusing on privacy and other data protection measures.[xli] The nation’s recently adopted GENIUS Act is already noted to be more lenient than the EU’s Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA) Regulation, which was adopted 2023.[xlii]  

Cash is the only form of public money currently accessible to all.[xliii] Therefore, many have cautioned about the consequences of citizens losing this access if digitalization leads to the disappearance of cash.[xliv] If this happens, “[t]here would in effect no longer be a functional legal tender, with the operation of the monetary system turned over to private entities.” [xlv] Noone will be able to say that they did not have warning. Public access to sovereign money is not merely a technical issue, but a democratic one: without it, the legitimacy of monetary authority could erode.

Accordingly, the digital dollar could represent a viable path to preserving the use of public money and upkeep of U.S. monetary sovereignty. CBDCs are not without risk, and the privacy concerns underlying the nation’s current ban on retail CBDCs are valid.[xlvi] However, privacy is not intrinsic to any form of digital currency and, therefore, protection through design and regulation needs to be considered and implemented for both stablecoins and CBDCs.[xlvii] The successful adoption of a CBDC will ultimately depend on public trust in the new currency and its issuer, as well as on the perceived independence of the central bank.[xlviii] At a minimum, the nation should allow its agencies to research how to develop the technological and regulatory frameworks necessary to mitigate the risks associated with retail CBDCs and ensure the public’s trust and adoption of the currency. Stablecoins should continue to be issued but must be subject to intense regulation that ensures transparency, reliability, and alignment with the public interest in order to protect the stability of the financial system.[xlix] It seems that the contest between public and private money will define the next phase of monetary sovereignty; the question is whether the United States will continue to shape the global monetary order or be forced to react to more trusted sovereign designs abroad.

Caroline Packard is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVIII. 

[i] See Edward D. Martino, Monetary sovereignty in the digital era. The law & macroeconomics of digital private money, 52 Comput. L. & Sec. Rev. 1, 2–4 (2024), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026736492300119X (discussing the “pendulum” that has swung between private and public monetary control since before the American Civil War, where no singular government-backed currency was issued, resulting in an economically inefficient system).

[ii] See id. at 5 (providing examples of forms of private and public money).

[iii] See id. at 1 (explaining a state is only considered ‘sovereign’ if it has “some form of control over territory and people”).

[iv] See id. at 2.

[v] See id. at 1; see also id. at 4 (showing the modern state has a monopoly on circulating money which are “claims towards public or private entities that circulate as a medium of exchange …. that are negotiable by transfer alone. The transaction history of the instrument does not matter.” This is in comparison to account-based money that is currently present in both public and private forms).

[vi] See id. at 4 (noting that unlike the State, “[p]rivate parties lack the fiscal capacity to back liquidity and safety promises” but can “leverage[e] the law of contract and property . . . . [to] use other assets to back these promises and mimic the State's fiscal backstop”).

[vii] See id. at 1–2.

[viii] See id. at 5 (explaining that stablecoins are a form of circulating money that have the “possibility of competing with public money,” unlike other private monies that compliment, rather than compete, with public money).

[ix] See id. at 5 (arguing that stablecoins and like technologies “can threaten monetary sovereignty, eroding State control over money”); Martino, supra note 1, at 1 (arguing that “the control over money has become a quintessential component of the sovereignty of modern States”).

[x] See Jean-Pierre Landau & Sarah Nicole, Sciences Po, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY IN A DIGITAL WORLD,  SciencesPo §1 (2024), https://www.sciencespo.fr/public/chaire-numerique/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/DIGITAL-SOVEREIGNTY-policy-brief.pdf; Yanyang Chu & Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Monetary Sovereignty and Central Bank Digital Currencies: Competing Models for Future Cross-Border Payment Platforms, 16 Global Policy 329, 330  (explaining that monetary sovereignty “indicate[s] the ability of a central bank to independently and effectively carry out its mandates in maintaining price stability by conducting monetary policies. Central bank macroeconomic policy tools, both interbank interest rates for reserves and the management of money supply rely on their being the monopoly supplier of money.”(citations omitted)).

[xi] See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §1 (“The loss of control restricts a country’s ability to manage economic fluctuations and respond to crises independently, making it vulnerable to domestic or external shocks.”).

[xii] See Chu & Rathbun, supra note 10, at 330 (“The existence and public acceptance of any currency other than the one issued by the central bank may threaten monetary sovereignty.”).

[xiii] See Christine Lagarde, The future of money – innovating while retaining trust, Eur. Cent. Bank  (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2020/html/ecb.in201130~ce64cb35a3.en.html (originally published in L’ENA hors les murs magazine) (“People accept money only if it is highly trusted, maintains its value and respects privacy – an aspect that is becoming increasingly important in the digital age.”); See also, Michael Sung & Christopher A. Thomas, The innovator’s dilemma and U.S. adoption of a digital dollar, Brookings Inst. (March 24, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-innovators-dilemma-and-u-s-adoption-of-a-digital-dollar/ (explaining that currencies have to have users trust to be effective as  “stores of value and medium of exchanges”); Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §4 (noting that development of public and private digital currencies will be effected by “[t]he simultaneous erosion of trust in both centralized platform networks and state institutions”).

[xiv] See Volker Brühl, How will the digital euro work? A preliminary analysis of design, structures, and challenges, 35 Elec. Mkts. no. 78, 2025, at 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5233396 (“The growing interest in CBDCs is driven by decreasing demand for physical cash in the digital age and advances in the tokenisation of assets, rights, and payment instruments, which enable the digital encryption of financial instruments (‘crypto assets’).”); Chu & Rathbun, supra note 10, at 329; see also, Piero Cipollone, Member, Eur. Cent. Bank Exec. Bd., Keynote Address at the Baltic Digital Euro Conference: Payments & Policy in a Changing Environment (Sept. 29, 2025), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp250904~70ab593276.en.html (quantifying how the rise of online payments in Europe between 2019 and 2024 was accompanied by an even faster decline in use of cash in day-to-day transactions “from 68% to 40% in volume terms and from 40% to 24% in value terms”); Lagarde, supra note 13 (noting that dematerialization process spurred by digitalization was accelerated by COVID-19).

[xv] See Brühl, supra note 14, at 1

[xvi] See Matteo Cotugno et al., Ready for a digital Euro? Insights from a research agenda, 67 Rsch. Int’l Bus. & Fin. 1, 2 (2024), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027553192300243X (describing CBDCs and some of their potential economic and policy uses).

[xvii] See Brühl, supra note 14, at 77 (“A retail CBDC is a digital alternative to physical cash (notes and coins, NAC) and can, as such, be used by retail customers in day-to-day payment transactions. A wholesale CBDC is a digital representation of central bank reserves, which could be used by banks and other qualified financial institutions to settle payments and securities transactions in real time using a common platform.”).

[xviii] See Central Bank Digital Currency Tracker, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/ (last updated July 2025).

[xix] See id.

[xx] See Sung & Thomas, supra note 13 (explaining that governments have been spurred to develop CBDCs in response to the global adoption of cryptocurrencies by consumers, which is “ushering in a more decentralized era in global finance”); Brühl supra note 14 at 78 (specifically highlighting the dissemination of stablecoins as a reason for central banks’ CBDC work)

[xxi] See Sandra Waliczek, How are CBDCs different from cryptocurrencies and stablecoins?, World Economic Forum, (Nov. 9, 2023) https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/cbdcs-how-different-cryptocurrency-stablecoin/ (noting that CBDCs, like cash, are direct liabilities of the central bank and are, therefore, “a safer form of digital money than commercial bank-issued digital money” whereas crypto “is not considered legal tender and users are not protected from price volatility, theft because of hacking or even when crypto firms collapse” as its not backed by a central public authority or by the banking system and “is not considered legal tender”).

[xxii] See Jurgen Schaaf, From hype to hazard: what stablecoins mean for Europe, Euro. Centr. Bank: Blog (July 28, 2025), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2025/html/ecb.blog20250728~e6cb3cf8b5.en.html (“Stablecoins are crypto tokens issued on distributed ledgers (i.e. “on-chain”) aiming to maintain a stable value relative to a traditional asset – typically via a peg to currency such as the US dollar. This is achieved by offering convertibility on demand at par. Stablecoins are inherently different from non-backed crypto assets like Bitcoin and Ether, which lack both intrinsic value and redeemability.”)

[xxiii] See Martino, supra note 1, at 7; see also Schaaf, supra note 22 (highlighting that The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) issued a warning about stablecoins and the fragility of their peg, in their 2025 Annual Economic Report, including concerns regarding “the potential for stablecoins to undermine monetary sovereignty, transparency issues and the risk of capital flight from emerging economies”); Waliczek, supra note 23.

[xxiv]See Dylan Butts, PayPal’s crypto partner mints a whopping $330 trillion worth of stablecoins in ‘technical error,’ CNBC (Oct. 28, 2025 at 6:06 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/16/paypals-crypto-partner-mints-300-trillion-stablecoins-in-technical-error.html

[xxv]See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §3 (explaining that each new type of currency increases the risk of fragmentation, “threatening to erode the universal acceptance and fungibility that traditional currencies have long enjoyed”); Lagarde, supra note 13 (noting that the widespread adoption of Stablecoins “could threaten [a State’s] financial stability and monetary sovereignty. For instance, if the issuer cannot guarantee a fixed value or if they are perceived as being incapable of absorbing losses, a run could occur.”); Martino, supra note 1, at 9 (agreeing that allowing stablecoins to “move toward the apex of the financial system would considerably threaten monetary sovereignty. Even more so in times of crises, when the probability of public backstop increases. This means that if stablecoins can gain a degree of centrality in the financial system, their inherent fragility will not only be a financial stability concern but will also erode the States control over money”); Schaaf, supra note 22 (explaining that stablecoins could threaten financial stability as they intertwine with traditional financial institutions, “e.g. through custody arrangements and derivative exposures, . . . . [as] [a] disorderly collapse could reverberate across the financial system, and the risk of contagion is a growing concern for central banks”).

[xxvi] See Schaaf, supra note 22 (noting that US dollar-based stablecoins account for “some 99% of total stablecoin market capitalization” whereas “euro-denominated stablecoins remain marginal – with market capitalisation of less than €350 million.”).

[xxvii] See id.

[xxviii] See Sung & Thomas, supra note 13 (explaining that the current “primacy of the U.S. dollar grants the U.S. government and economy special privileges, including the ability to print money with relative freedom, issue debt at low interest rates reducing the cost of capital both for the government and U.S. firms, maintain long-term and persistent trade surpluses.”); id. (“Digital currencies will render obsolete many existing standards and rules of the international monetary system. The emerging international monetary ecosystem will be populated with digital currencies from countries around the world . . . . When the technology allows seamless and instantaneous convertibility from one sovereign currency into another, it changes the practical need for a dominant global reserve currency. The U.S. government needs to rapidly position digital payment and finance options that serves the needs of the United States, its financial system, its allies, and its global trade partners.”)

[xxix] See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §3.

[xxx] David Krause, Do the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act and the GENIUS Act Jeopardize U.S. Digital Finance?, CLS Blue Sky Blog (Aug. 11, 2025), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2025/08/11/do-the-anti-cbdc-surveillance-state-act-and-the-genius-act-jeopardize-u-s-digital-finance/  (“In July 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act (H.R. 1919), legislation prohibiting the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) directly to the public. Days later, President Trump signed the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for private, dollar-denominated stablecoins.”); see also Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 C.F.R 8647 (2025) (revoking President Biden’s 2022 Executive Order 14067,‘Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets,’ while promoting digital private money).

[xxxi] Krause, supra note 30 (arguing that the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act and GENIUS Act “signal a clear policy direction: prioritizing private-sector innovation while explicitly rejecting state-sponsored digital currency”); Schaaf, supra note 22 (“The US Administration has made it clear – through executive orders, congressional testimony and social media – that its support for stablecoins goes beyond just encouraging technological innovation.”)

[xxxii] Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 C.F.R 8647 (2025).

[xxxiii] See Dylan Butts, The Trump crypto firm is planning expansion, from tokenized commodities to debit cards, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2025 at 10:26 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/01/trump-crypto-firm-expansion-with-tokenized-commodities-debit-cards.html/.

[xxxiv] See Martino, supra note 1, at 6 (Explaining that stablecoins aiming to compete with public money have threatened monetary sovereignty when capable of leveraging the power issuing private party’s reputation and “what was considered a trustworthy technology. . . . Generating reliability and trustworthiness is sufficient to climb the hierarchy ladder of the financial system and get close to the apex, thus, increasing the de facto implicit guarantee of the Sovereign to backstop such promises”); see also, Lagarde, supra note 13 (“Stablecoins, particularly those backed by global technology firms (the “big techs”), could also present risks to competitiveness and technological autonomy in [the State], as they would attempt to leverage their competitive advantage and control of large platforms. Their dominant positions may harm competition and consumer choice, and raise concerns over data privacy and the misuse of personal information.”).

[xxxv] See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §4(B) (Libra, Meta’s planned global stablecoin to be backed by U.S. dollar, raised concerns that “state capital controls and monetary policies [would] find themselves in direct competition . . . .  [and, therefore] was met with strong pushback by Government and regulators. Almost immediately, Libra was described as a threat to monetary sovereignty. . . . [as] the introduction of [ ] a [global] stablecoin would have further destabilized traditional monetary systems by presenting an alternative means of exchange outside governmental control. Just a few months after the announcement, the U.S House Committee on Financial Services Democrats asked the company to stop the development of Libra. As these platforms evolve and expand their influence . . . . the fragility of traditional notions of sovereignty becomes increasingly evidence, demanding a reevaluation of power dynamics and regulatory frameworks in the digital age.”); Emily Nicole, Ghost of Facebook’s Libra Haunts Stablecoin Rules Five Years Later, Bloomberg (Apr. 16,2024 at 5:04 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-04-16/ghost-of-facebook-s-libra-haunts-stablecoin-rules-five-years-later (noting that Libra, as “the first major challenge to central bank money from digital assets,[ ] drew an immediate and sustained rebuke from authorities worldwide . . . . [as what] bank officials saw was a tech company with the power to issue new money to a vast userbase -- and ultimately create ‘an excessive concentration of economic power’. . . . As a result, there’s been nothing like it since”); Martino, supra note 1, at 6.

[xxxvi] See Martino, supra note 1, at 6

[xxxvii] See Schaaf, supra note 22 (acknowledging the “political volatility and regulatory divergence” elsewhere, offers Europe a “unique opportunity” given its “stable institutional framework and rules-based approach provide a solid foundation for trust”); see also, id. (“If the Eurosystem and the European Union can build on this advantage – through robust regulation, infrastructure investment and digital currency innovation – the euro could emerge from this period of change as a stronger currency. In a world of shifting sands, the euro has the potential to be the bedrock on which others can build.”).

[xxxviii] See Schaaf, supra note 22 (acknowledging the “political volatility and regulatory divergence” elsewhere, offers Europe a “unique opportunity” given its “stable institutional framework and rules-based approach provide a solid foundation for trust”); see also, id. (“If the Eurosystem and the European Union can build on this advantage – through robust regulation, infrastructure investment and digital currency innovation – the euro could emerge from this period of change as a stronger currency.”).

[xxxix] See Lagarde, supra note 12 (“A digital euro would complement cash and ensure that consumers continue to have unrestricted access to central bank money in a form that meets their evolving digital payment needs.”).

[xl] See Cipollone, supra note 14.

[xli] See Brühl, supra note 14, at 77 (explaining the “privacy by design” concept and compliance requirements that will ensure “[t]he privacy and data protection of digital euro users . . . . [as] [i]t is the ambition of the Eurosystem to implement the highest standard of cybersecurity and to offer a level of data privacy in offline transactions that is as close as possible to bilateral cash transactions”)

[xlii] See Schaaf, supra note 22 (noting that the GENIUS Act “more lenient in some areas” than the EU’s Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA) Regulation).

[xliii] See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §3(B)

[xliv] See id.; Brühl, supra note 14, at 77 (“Some promoters of a CBDC maintain that citizens will no longer have access to central bank money if demand for cash continues to fall and becomes marginalised in the future. In such a scenario, trust in the currency would entirely depend on trust in financial intermediaries issuing commercial money.”).

[xlv] See Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §3(B).

[xlvi] See Cotugno et al., supra note 16, at 2 (discussing how CBDCs could upset to the stability of the financial system – possibly allowing for bank runs, consequential bank disintermediation, and the crowding out of private banks)

[xlvii] Landau & Nicole, supra note 10, §4(D) (“Cash is private by nature. It guarantees third-party anonymity and it leaves no traces. Regulation is necessary to limit the privacy it confers. For a digital currency, the logic is inverted . . . .  for a digital currency, privacy has to be decided, organized, and embedded into its design.”).

[xlviii] See Lagarde, supra note 12 (“Central banks’ institutional independence also bolsters their ability to maintain trust in money.”).

[xlix] See Martino, supra note 1, at 8 (“Monetary competition makes the financial system unstable, and this represents the key rationale for regulating private money.”).

This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.