The United States’ Seizure of Venezuela’s Oil: Legal Asset Seizure or Unlawful Expropriation?
On January 3, 2026, the United States captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife to face charges related to narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.[i] U.S. officials have acknowledged that a central objective of the operation was access to Venezuela’s oil.[ii] President Trump stated that the United States will be running Venezuela for “much longer” than a year and that the United States will be “using oil” and “taking oil,” with White House officials asserting the United States will “assume control of selling Venezuela’s oil indefinitely.”[iii]
Although Venezuela restructured numerous foreign-owned oil projects in the 2000s, with several US oil companies securing favorable arbitral awards,[iv] the question remains whether the United States may lawfully take control of and sell Venezuela’s oil under international law.
The United States and Venezuela are both member states of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), whose charters and resolutions emphasize state sovereignty.[v] Article 2 of the UN Charter states that the UN “is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members,” and disputes between member states shall be resolved by peaceful means, and that member states shall refrain from the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”[vi]
Similarly, the OAS Charter declares that “[t]he fundamental rights of States may not be impaired in any manner whatsoever,” and “[n]o State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.”[vii] Among these fundamental rights is the right to sovereignty.[viii]
UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 further clarifies the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, affirming that “the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised” in a manner that preserves state sovereignty.[ix] While the resolution permits nationalization, it requires appropriate compensation through arbitration or international adjudication, not through invasion and seizure.[x] Both the United States and Venezuela voted in favor of Resolution 1803.[xi]
UN General Assembly Resolution 3171 reinforces these principles, emphasizing that coercing states in the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources violates the UN Charter and threatens international peace and security.[xii]
On January 7, 2026, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, announced negotiations with the United States for the sale of oil.[xiii] This statement raised serious concern about coercion following the invasion and statements by U.S. officials claiming control over Venezuela.
As mentioned above, both the UN and the OAS frameworks prohibit the use of force or coercion that disrupts a State’s right to sovereignty, including sovereignty over natural resources. If PDVSA entered negotiations under coercion, the United States would be acting in violation of the UN and OAS and the resulting agreement will be potentially illegitimate under international law.[xiv]
One possibility in which Venezuela’s oil might be lawfully seized would be for payment of arbitral awards owed to U.S.-based oil companies.[xv] In cases including ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela and Mobil and Others v. Venezuela, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awarded billions of dollars to investors after Venezuela’s expropriation in the 2000s.[xvi] Investors will often proceed to domestic courts for enforcement proceedings, which may authorize asset seizure under limited conditions.[xvii]
However, in a meeting with energy executives, President Trump explicitly rejected this possibility, saying “We’re not going to look at what people lost in the past, because that was their fault.”[xviii]
The seizure, indefinite control, and sale of Venezuela’s oil by the United States likely violate international law. These actions infringe upon Venezuela’s fundamental right to sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources and appear to rely on intimidation and coercion to make an agreement with PDVSA. Nonetheless, meaningful consequences for the United States are unlikely. International law does not have police power, and the United States’ veto power on the UN Security Council, combined with political and military strength in the Western Hemisphere, make serious international challenge improbable. As a result, the respect for state sovereignty has further eroded, emboldening powerful states to test the limits of international legal constraints.
Katherine Neal is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[i] See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, FACT SHEET: President Trump is Restoring Prosperity, Safety and Security for the United States and Venezuela (Jan. 7, 2026), https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-president-trump-restoring-prosperity-safety-and-security-united-states-and.
[ii] See The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Safeguards Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People (Jan. 9, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-safeguards-venezuelan-oil-revenue-for-the-good-of-the-american-and-venezuelan-people/.
[iii] See David E. Sanger et al., Trump Says U.S. Oversight of Venezuela Could Last for Years, The New York Times (Jan. 8, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-venezuela.html.
[iv] See Jarrett Renshaw, US Pushes Oil Majors to Invest Big in Venezuela if They Want to Recover Debts, Reuters (Jan. 5, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-pushes-oil-majors-invest-big-venezuela-if-they-want-recover-debts-2026-01-04/; Robert Rapier, Venezuela, Maduro and the Long Shadow of Oil Expropriation, Forbes (Jan. 03, 2026), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2026/01/03/venezuela-maduro-and-the-long-shadow-of-oil-expropriation/.
[v] Member States, The United Nations: About Us, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states; Member States, OAS: About OAS, https://www.oas.org/ext/en/main/oas/member-states.
[vi] See U.N. Charter art. 2.
[vii] See Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 12, 20.
[viii] See Sergio M. Carbone & Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, States, Fundamental Rights and Duties, Max Planck Enclyc. of Int’l Law [MPIL], (Jan. 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1112?d=%2F10.1093%2Flaw%3Aepil%2F9780199231690%2Flaw-9780199231690-e1112&p=emailAGINryfLBVcOA&print.
[ix] See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII), ¶ 14 (1962).
[x] Supra note ix.
[xi] Supra note ix (U.S. and Venez. voted in favor).
[xii] See G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171(XXVIII) (1973).
[xiii] See Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (petroleosdevenezuela), Threads, (Jan. 7, 2026), https://www.threads.com/@petroleosdevenezuela/post/DTOC866D3Zf?xmt=AQF0gH_8jcrYc_PC-AL7VYrrMYc3Hptr2Lfo6yGm66K5NOZfxr6BlX7VU_RD1B2ngD3TQSGU.
[xiv] See Rebecca F. Elliott & Robert Jimison, U.S. Sets Out Bare-Bones Plan to Control Venezuela’s Oil Sales, The New York Times (Jan. 7, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/business/energy-environment/us-venezuela-oil-control.html.
[xv] See Alvin Goldman, Is the U.S. Committing Theft in Trying to Control Venezuelan Oil Properties?, Justia: Verdict (Jan. 13, 2026), https://verdict.justia.com/2026/01/13/is-the-u-s-committing-theft-in-trying-to-control-venezuelan-oil-properties.
[xvi] ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. et al., v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Rectification, 21 (Aug. 29, 2019); Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, 132-33 (Oct. 9, 2014).
[xvii] See Mark Bravin, Theresa B. Bowman & Albina Gasanbekova, Collecting on Investor-State Arbitration Awards: Practical Steps to Enforcement Without Court Litigation, Global Arb. Rev. (Dec. 21, 2023), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-investment-treaty-protection-and-enforcement/third-edition/article/collecting-investor-state-arbitration-awards-practical-steps-enforcement-without-court-litigation.
[xviii] See Rebecca F. Elliott, Trump’s $100 Billion Venezuela Oil Plan Gets a Cool Reception, The New York Times (Jan. 9, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/09/business/energy-environment/trump-venezuela-oil-executives.html.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.