The Predicate Exception After Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos: Clarification or Uncertainty?
In 2005, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act was enacted, generally “barring lawsuits in federal or state court against firearm manufacturers, distributors, importers, and dealers when a third party acquires a firearm from that distribution chain and uses it for criminal ends.” [i] This statute, however, creates a key predicate exception which “leaves gun manufacturers and others open to civil liability if (1) they knowingly violated a federal or state statute regulating the sale or marketing of firearms, and (2) the defendant's violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.”[ii] The predicate exception has been highly scrutinized and unevenly applied because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on how broad or narrow the exception is, leaving no clear rule on which cases may proceed.[iii]
The case Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, which was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, further complicated the applicability of the predicate exception. In the case, the court considered whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the ‘proximate cause’ of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.[iv] Mexico alleges that the manufacturers were “willful accessories” in unlawful gun sales by retail gun dealers, which in turn enabled Mexican criminals to acquire guns, ultimately harming Mexico because of the misuse of weapons. [v]
In contesting proximate cause, the defendant, Smith & Wesson, illustrated the “multistep, attenuated causal chain of transactions from the manufacture of a firearm to the ultimate injured claimant,” noting that no court “has ever found proximate cause on such a remote theory.”[vi] Mexico argued that Smith & Wesson misinterpreted PLCAA’s proximate cause requirement. [vii]Mexico argued that the first step theory of proximate cause that the defendant utilized is historically rejected, exploitable, and inconsistent with PLCAA’s text and purpose.[viii] Mexico urged the court to instead focus on foreseeability, and not the defendant’s narrow interpretation.[ix] The Supreme Court ultimately did not address the proximate cause question, determining “Mexico had not plausibly alleged aiding and abetting on the manufacturers’ part.”[x]
Beyond proximate cause, the court held that Mexico failed to plausibly plead that its suit falls under the predicate exception.[xi] However, the court left the door open to a variety of further interpretive issues.
The majority held that “the predicate exception allows for accomplice liability only when a plaintiff makes a plausible allegation that a gun manufacturer “participate[d] in” a firearms violation “as in something that [it] wishe[d] to bring about” and sought to make succeed.”[xii] The majority was concerned that a broad reading of the predicate exception, could swallow PLCAA’s intent.
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, emphasized a need for a stricter requirement, such as proof of an actual adjudicated violation, not just allegations, to trigger PLCAA’s predicate exception.[xiii] Justice Jackson also concurred, agreeing that Mexico’s complaint failed to plausibly allege aiding and abetting any firearms violation.[xiv] She argued that Mexico’s complaint was problematic as it did not allege any specific statutory violations; instead, it relied on policy agreements.[xv] Justice Jackson believes the predicate exception should only apply when there is an actual statutory violation, as opposed to a mere allegation.[xvi] Thus, emphasizing the uncertainty and discourse on the scope of the exception.
In this case, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify how PLCAA should operate in transnational-harm cases. The court avoided addressing a central question raised by Mexico’s claims: whether U.S. firearm manufacturers can be held accountable when their commercial practices foreseeably contribute to violence beyond U.S. borders. Thus, this decision deepens uncertainty about the predicate exception and fails to address whether PLCAA shields manufacturers from liability for cross-border violence, even where that violence is a foreseeable consequence of their business practices.
Going forward, this decision leaves foreign governments seeking justice for gun violence connected to US manufacturers with uncertainty. Thus, countries may avoid litigation but still be harmed by US manufacturers. Until Congress or the US court system clarifies the scope of the predicate exception, litigants, individuals, and entities seeking redress will be disadvantaged, as the scope of the predicate exception is increasingly unclear.
Haley Rubin is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[i] Jordan B. Cohen & Dave S. Sidhu, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: The Supreme Court Recognizes Statutory Immunity for Firearm Companies in Case Brought by the Government of Mexico, CRS Report No. R48715 (Sept. 19, 2025) CRS Report No. R48715 (Sept. 19, 2025), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48715.
[ii] Id.
[iii] See Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund, IV. Predicate Exception, Everytown Law (last updated Oct. 28, 2024) https://everytownlaw.org/plcaa-guide/iv-predicate-exception/
[iv] Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 291, 145 S. Ct. 1556, 1565, 221 L. Ed. 2d 910 (2025)
[v] See id. at 280 – 281
[vi] Linda S. Mullenix, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, ABA Supreme Court Preview (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/preview_home/smith-wesson-v-estados-unidos-mexicanos/
[vii] See SMITH & WESSON BRANDS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, Respondent., 2025 WL 104100, at *4
[viii] See id.
[ix] See id.
[x] Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 291, 145 S. Ct. 1556, 1565, 221 L. Ed. 2d 910 (2025)
[xi] See id. at 281
[xii] Id. at 299
[xiii] See id. at 299–300
[xiv] See id. at 300 –302
[xv] See id.
[xvi] See id.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.