Accountability Under the ICC: Do All Roads Lead to Rome?
On February 28, 2026, the United States (“U.S.”) joined Israel in surprise missile airstrike attacks on Iran sparking the start of a war.[i] This is one of many acts of war in recent years that gave no notice from any international body.[ii] The Russo-Ukraine War and the Gaza War are some standouts in recent international memory.[iii] All these instances featured war crimes.[iv]
The question of handling war crimes has long been attempted.[v] First, there were the Nuremberg Trials.[vi] Then came the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provided the body for international humanitarian law.[vii] The UN Security Council’s (“UNSC”) universal jurisdiction was established as the body for enforcement.[viii] In 1998, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was established with the Rome Statute.[ix] The statute identifies the four core international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.[x] The ICC can investigate and prosecute these crimes only when nations fail to do so, making it a last resort.[xi] Most importantly, the ICC is bound by member states that sign onto the statute.[xii]
Non-member states are not bound by the jurisdiction.[xiii] It just so happens that the countries that are non-member states are some of the most powerful militaries in the world, frequently committing the international crimes the ICC is designed for.[xiv] These countries include United States, Israel, Russia, and China.[xv] For example, in 2025, the U.S. imposed sanctions on ICC judges and prosecutors, claiming that investigations into American-Israeli joint actions were a threat to the sovereignty of each nation.[xvi]
The results of this were both immediate and impactful for the ICC. The targeted officials faced asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions from services from U.S. companies.[xvii] The immediate targeting of these individuals by the U.S. also resulted in a reluctance for companies and individuals (including contractors, partners, and witnesses) to work with the ICC out of fear of U.S. sanctions.[xviii] UN experts and NGOs accused the U.S. of trying to politicize and intimate international judges to establish international immunity.[xix] The ICC issued a statement that the U.S. committed a “…flagrant attack against the independence of an impartial judicial institution…”, warning that the international legal order itself was at risk.[xx] This instance reveals how limiting the ICC’s dependence on state cooperation can be.[xxi] As soon as major powers oppose the ICC, the entire jurisdiction of the ICC falls apart. This jurisdictional gap of state actor impunity in the face of noncooperation has not been remedied by the Rome Statute.[xxii]
There is also an issue with not having any independent enforcement mechanisms.[xxiii] Collective action of individual states is needed to enforce the ICC.[xxiv] Arrests and warrants are made by the states, and not an international body.[xxv] Often, there is self-interest in a member nation state to not comply or report to the ICC.[xxvi] The ICC can act only on recommendation of the UNSC.[xxvii]
The UNSC contains veto powers for the U.S., China, and Russia.[xxviii] This is a further complexity to the political constraints held on the ICC. The result is a symbolic institution in the ICC that does not hold any authority or legitimate hard power on any of the most obvious culprits.[xxix]
Thankfully, there are potential solutions to this systemic issue.[xxx] The Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) (governing body of the ICC) does not currently collaborate with the ICC in negotiations with the UNSC.[xxxi] That can change by enforcing commitments to UNSC nations that make cooperation binding.[xxxii] Non-member states should be met with unilateral sanctions from the ICC and its governing bodies. This is the same threat that is used by nations such as the U.S.[xxxiii] It would be imperative to use these methods at offending non-member states, to deliver legitimacy and power to the ICC. Emphasizing unilateral force both through enforcement mechanisms (law enforcement on behalf of the ICC), and economic sanctions, will ensure that non-member states are not acting with impunity.[xxxiv] The act would also bring further collaboration with the UNSC, promoting legitimacy to the United Nations as a whole, which is much needed.[xxxv]
In 2025, video essayist Jacob Geller discussed what he called “Fantasies of Nuremberg.”[xxxvi] Geller illustrated the disappointing reality of international accountability for war crimes during the Nuremberg Trials.[xxxvii] The same can be said at any large international law effort for war crime accountability, when hard measures are not enforceable.[xxxviii] Until bolder action is put into international law and strictly enforced, we will see more instances of moral crimes committed by nations that choose not to cooperate.
Noah Sergio is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.
[i] See Ava Berger, These are the casualties and cost of the war in Iran 2 weeks into the conflict, NPR (Mar. 14, 2026), https://www.npr.org/2026/03/14/nx-s1-5746623/iran-war-cost-deaths.
[ii] See Tom Bateman & Imogen James, International law experts allege violations in Iran war, BBC News (Apr. 3, 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy91x2n29nlo.
[iii] See Palestine: ICC Warrants Revive Hope for Long-Delayed Justice, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 21, 2024), https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/21/palestine-icc-warrants-revive-hope-long-delayed-justice; See also Human Rights Council to establish Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, UN News (Mar. 4, 2022), https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113292.
[iv] See Palestine, supra note 3; See also Bateman & James, supra note 2.
[v] See Amanda Alexander, A Short History of International Humanitarian Law, 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 109, 113 (2015).
[vi] See id.
[vii] See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
[viii] See id.
[ix] See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
[x] See id.
[xi] See Katherine Angell, When Not in the Rome Statute: Enforcement Options for the International Criminal Court and the International Community’s Response to U.S. Sanctions, American University Int’l L. Rev. (Oct. 2025), https://auilr.org/2025/10/25/when-not-in-the-rome-statute-enforcement-options-for-the-international-criminal-court-and-the-international-communitys-response-to-u-s-sanctions/.
[xii] See id.
[xiii] See Daniel Shields‑Huemer, From the Hague to National Courts: Can Domestic Universal Jurisdiction Deliver Where the ICC Cannot?, Yale J. Int’l L. (July 2025), https://yjil.yale.edu/posts/2025‑07‑09‑from‑the‑hague‑to‑national‑courts‑can‑domestic‑universal‑jurisdiction‑delive.
[xiv] See generally Angell, supra note 11; See generally Huemer, supra note 13.
[xv] See id.
[xvi] See The White House, Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court (Feb. 6, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/; See Angell, supra note 11.
[xvii] Scott Young, U.S. Sanctions Against the International Criminal Court, Harvard Law School (Mar. 25, 2026), https://hls.harvard.edu/today/u-s-sanctions-against-the-international-criminal-court/.
[xviii] What Do the Trump Administration’s Sanctions on the ICC Mean for Justice and Human Rights?, Amnesty Int’l (Mar. 25, 2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2025/03/what-do-the-trump-administrations-sanctions-on-the-icc-mean-for-justice-and-human-rights/.
[xix] USA: UN Expert Demands Withdrawal of Sanctions Against ICC Judges and Prosecutors, Calls for Repeal of Executive Order, Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/usa-un-expert-demands-withdrawal-sanctions-against-icc-judges-and.
[xx] Joseph Stepansky, US Sanctions More ICC Judges, Citing Ruling on Israeli War Crime Probe, Al Jazeera (Dec. 18, 2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/18/us-sanctions-more-icc-judges-citing-ruling-on-israeli-war-crime-probe/.
[xxi] Bhavya Johari, Cooperation Without Consequence: The Rome Statute’s Mandatory Optatives and International Criminal Justice’s Fragility, Global Pol’y J. Blog (Jan. 20, 2026), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/01/2026/cooperation-without-consequence-rome-statutes-mandatory-optatives-and-international.
[xxii] See Emma Askarisirchi, International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Pursuit of Global Justice: “A Court Worth Having”—Predicaments to the Court’s Enforcement and Frameworks for Improving Compliance, 57 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 148, 153 (2025).
[xxiii] See Huemer, supra note 13.
[xxiv] See id.
[xxv] See Askarisirchi, supra note 22 at 185.
[xxvi] See id.
[xxvii] See Askarisirchi, supra note 22 at 155.
[xxviii] See Huemer, supra note 13.
[xxix] See generally id.
[xxx] See generally Askarisirchi, supra note 22.
[xxxi] See id. at 185.
[xxxii] See id.
[xxxiii] See The White House, supra note 16.
[xxxiv] See Askarisirchi, supra note 22 at 185.
[xxxv] See id.
[xxxvi] See Jacob Geller, Fantasies of Nuremberg, YouTube (Jul. 25, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9Ay5tzHIBU.
[xxxvii] See id.
[xxxviii] See generally id.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.