The Iran Strikes and the Limits of International Law

On Saturday the 28th of February, the United States and Israel launched military strikes on Iran.  The supreme leader of Iran was killed over the weekend and Iranian retaliatory attacks have dragged neighboring nations into the fray.[i]  The ramifications of this remain unclear – the situation has devolved into a regional war with no end in sight.[ii]  Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain have all condemned the Iranian retaliatory strikes.[iii]  Spain, however, condemned not only the Iranian regime, but also the United States and Israel – suggesting that the United States and Israel violated international law.[iv]  To evaluate such a claim, we must first determine what constitutes international law.  

There is no unified book or collection of international law that says what countries can and cannot do.  The concept of international law is a loose one – the 195 countries on the planet operate under an ever-shifting morass of treaties and norms collectively referred to as customary international law.[v]  Given that norms are often contradictory, and there seems to be no global consensus on how to resolve such contradictions, the most straightforward way to evaluate the legality of the strikes in Iran is by looking to the U.N. Charter – the international treaty that birthed the United Nations.

The U.N. Charter was ratified by all member states – this resulted in all member states agreeing to abide by the rules laid out within (and in doing so creating the U.N.).[vi]  Accordingly, violating any of the rules agreed to would constitute a violation of the U.N. Charter itself.  A violation of the U.N. Charter is thus considered a violation of international law.[vii]  Article 2(4) of the U.N Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”[viii]  Chapter VII Articles 39—42 lay out the process for taking military action to restore “international peace and security,” which requires a joint decision from the U.N. Security Council.[ix]

Exceptions to the U.N. Charter with regard to military action include a response to an armed attack, or in some cases military action to protect against an imminent threat.[x]  The justification for the recent attacks on Iran is rooted in the risk their nuclear program poses to the rest of the world – though the June 2025 attack ostensibly “obliterated Iran’s nuclear facilities.”[xi]  Iran’s continued violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions limiting their nuclear program were also cited as justification.[xii]

The factors put forward for military intervention in Iran do not suggest an imminent threat – at the very least no more imminent than at any other point in the last year.[xiii]  United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained the policy reasons behind the intervention – that Iran would respond to any attack (from any nation) with retaliatory action against the United States, combined with Iranian military buildup and nuclear development, meant immediate action was necessary.[xiv]  Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz stated “[t]he political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”[xv]  In other words, military goals cannot supersede policy goals – and in international law, policy goals allow for war only in face of an imminent threat.  Whether policy goals led to military action in Iran at all is unclear – the concept of war with Iran has been referenced by United States politicians for over a decade.[xvi]  The question of “what happens if we go to war with Iran” may well have morphed into “what happens when we go to war with Iran” – all without considering the policy question of “should we go to war with Iran.”  Irrespective of the reasons behind the United States intervention, a clear immediate threat has not been shown.  Accordingly, claiming that the attack on Iran was a violation of international law has merit.  Failure to demonstrate an imminent threat results in these actions contravening the U.N. Charter – and thus constituting violations of international law.

Unlike speeding or committing a felony, violating international law does not come with a set sanction or penalty.[xvii]  The treaties and norms that shape how countries interact are malleable and reliant on all parties abiding by them.  That military action in Iran be justified morally, pragmatically, or politically does not alter the fact that it was a violation of international law.  In a world where international law relies on norms and adherence to treaties, violations such as these threaten the continued stability of international relations. 

Sanctions and U.N. resolutions are the most common reactions to such violations, but the imposition of sanctions on the United States and Israel in response to the Iranian attack are unlikely.[xviii]  The Iranian regime remains unpopular at home and maintains “allied armed and terrorist groups across the Middle East” – a policy choice that does not endear them to the international community.[xix]  Despite this, the framework of international law is fragile, and held together only by norms and established precedent; violations of international law should at the very least be condemned harshly around the world when they occur regardless of whether they can be morally or politically justified.  Spain’s strong condemnation of both the initial military action and the Iranian response—in addition to barring use of Spanish military bases—is a model response that more nations should emulate.[xx]

Scott Warner-Hudson is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLIX.

[i] See Philip Loft, Research Briefing: US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026, House of Commons Library 5—6 (U.K. Government).

[ii] See Jeremy Bowen, Three days in, we still have no idea where this war is heading, BBC (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c178z0p902vo.

[iii] See Philip Loft, Research Briefing: US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026, House of Commons Library 10 (U.K. Government).

[iv] See Pedro Sanchez, (@sanchezcastejon), X (Feb. 28, 2026, at 06:29 ET), https://x.com/sanchezcastejon/status/2027707726738923754 (Spanish Prime Ministerial statement) (“We condemn the unilateral military action taken by the U.S. and Israel – it is an escalation that contributes to a more hostile and uncertain international order.  We likewise condemn the actions taken by the Iranian regime and Revolutionary Guard.  We cannot allow another prolonged devastating war in the Middle East.  We implore immediate de-escalation and respect for international law.  It is time to resume dialogue and reach a long-lasting political solution for the region.”)  (Translated from Spanish); see also Carlos E. Cué, Pedro Sánchez, ante el ataque de Estados Unidos e Israel a Irán: “No a la Guerra, no vamos a apoyar este desastre” [Pedro Sanchez, on the attack on Iran by the United States and Israel: “No to war, we will not support this disaster”] El País (Mar. 4, 2026), https://elpais.com/espana/2026-03-04/pedro-sanchez-comparece-despues-de-la-amenaza-de-trump-de-cortar-relaciones-comerciales-con-espana.html (In response to current action in Iran, the Spanish government barred the use of its military bases (operated jointly with the United States) for strikes on Iran, with Sanchez declaring that “You cannot respond to one illegal act with another” (translated from Spanish)).

[v] See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1804 (2009).

[vi] See generally U.N. Charter art. 2.

[vii] See Krister Rasmussen, Lawful Ends to Unlawful Wars, 135 Yale L. J. 695, 707 (2025) (Whether a violation of international law is “illegal” is a deeper philosophical question which I will not be addressing here.).

[viii] U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

[ix] U.N. Charter art. 39—42.

[x] Saeed Bagheri, Iran strikes: Expert explains UN rules on force, University of Reading (Feb. 28, 2026) https://www.reading.ac.uk/news/2026/Expert-Comment/Iran-strikes-expert-explains-the-UN-rules-on-force.

[xi] The White House, Experts Agree: Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Have Been Obliterated (Jun 26. 2025) https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/experts-agree-irans-nuclear-facilities-have-been-obliterated/.

[xii] See Loft, supra note 1, at 4.

[xiii] See Defence Intelligence Agency DIA_F_25M5A_A, ‘Golden Dome’ Missile Threat Assessment (2025) (“Iran has space launch vehicles it could use to develop a militarily-viable ICBM by 2035 should Tehran decide to pursue the capability”).

[xiv] See U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press (Mar. 2, 2026) https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-press-6/.

[xv] Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., Princeton University Press 1976) (1832).

[xvi] See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Oct. 9, 2012, at 17:39 ET), https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/255784560904773633 (“Now that Obama’s poll numbers are in tailspin – watch him to launch a strike in Libya or Iran.  He is desperate.”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Nov. 10, 2013, at 21:55 ET), https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/399731975432728576 (“Remember that I predicted a long time ago that President Obama will attack Iran because of his inability to negotiate properly-not skilled!”).

[xvii] See Rasmussen supra note 7 at 710.

[xviii] See Michael D. Shear, et al. U.S. and Allies Impose Sanctions on Russia as Biden Condemns ‘Invasion’ of Ukraine, The New York Times (Feb. 22, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/us/politics/us-russia-ukraine-sanctions.html.

[xix] See Loft, supra note 1, at 14.

[xx] Some argue that Sánchez’s response to the war in Iran is an effort to make up for his party’s unpopularity domestically – regardless of the motivations, the Spanish response supports the rule of law on the world stage and should be lauded.  See Jason Horowitz, Spain’s Leader, Rejecting Iran War, Escalates Long Feud with Trump, The New York Times (Mar. 4, 2026) https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/04/world/europe/trump-spain-iran-sanchez.html.

This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.